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4 SPECIFIC CIRCUMSTANCES THAT EXPLAIN THE      
DIFFERENCES  
4.1. Different foundations for emergency measures  
4.2. Decisions embedded in the established respective case law of each 
Council of State   
    4.3. Timing, factual differences or a different willingness to use its powers? 




During the pandemic caused by the COVID-19, States have adopted several 
measures to curb the propagation of the virus. In Western Europe, the considerable number 
of cases and hospitalisations recorded in March triggered the enactment of rules intended to 
reduce physical contacts and break transmission chains. Many of these measures involved 
limitations of fundamental rights, namely the right to privacy and family life, the right to 
education, freedom of enterprise or freedom of movement2. This paper focuses on freedom 
of religion and freedom of demonstration. International and national provisions protect 
them. 
In Belgium and France, public authorities adopted two similar measures. First, 
they decided to prohibit demonstrations, since gatherings were forbidden. Second, religious 
ceremonies were cancelled, except for weddings and funerals. As the paper shows, these 
injunctions were not (successfully) judicially challenged during the early stages of the 
pandemic. However, the progressive easing of the first lockdown changed the 
 
2 For a non-exhaustive list regarding Belgium, see: F. Bouhon et. al., 'L’État belge face à la 
pandémie de Covid-19 : esquisse d’un régime d’exception', Courrier hebdomadaire du 
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circumstances. In France and Belgium, associations and individuals decided to contest 
these measures in front of the Council of State during the 'déconfinement'. The Council of 
State is the supreme administrative court in each jurisdictional system. The review of acts 
adopted by administrative authorities is one of its essential prerogatives.  
In France, the Council of State ruled in both cases that the restrictions to freedom 
of religion and freedom of demonstration were unconstitutional. The Belgian Council of 
State took a different stance: it rejected both claims and thus refused to suspend the 
prohibitions. This paper aims at analysing this contrasted jurisprudence during the COVID-
19 pandemic. On the one hand, it compares the jurisprudence of the two high administrative 
courts to present their differences and similarities. On the other hand, it attempts to provide 
explanations for the different patterns of the jurisprudence. This requires studying the legal 
context in which the decisions are respectively pronounced. Besides, the paper scrutinises 
specific differences between the cases and the management of the pandemic in France and 
Belgium. Decisions pronounced during the second lockdown, at the end of 2020, are also 
briefly evoked. 
This paper is structured as follows. First, the paper summarises the timing, facts, 
rules of procedures and decisions of the Council of State in both countries (2). Second, it 
compares the French and Belgian legal systems of fundamental rights protection (3). Third, 
it explores the case law of each Council of State and the characteristics of the cases to 
attempt to explain the different results reached by the two administrative courts (4). Final 
remarks close the paper and recapitulate the results of the analysis (5). In short, the paper 
underlines that no single factor can be isolated to explain the differences of case law 
between the two Councils of State. It is a combination of several elements, including the 
test of proportionality, factual differences or specific features of the system of protection of 
fundamental rights. 
2. TIMING, FACTS, PROCEDURES AND DECISIONS  
The first two sections introduce the timing of adoption of the contested measures 
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procedure applicable in each country (2.3.). Then, the last section analyses the reasoning of 
the Council of State in France and Belgium, respectively (2.4.).  
2.1. Timing 
Before analysing these decisions, it is useful to provide a short overview of legal 
events that led to the adoption of the contested measures in each country. The paper will 
analyse further the legal bases of the measures adopted to fight the pandemic. This section 
recounts the succession of decrees adopted in France and Belgium to limit the propagation 
of the virus. 
In France, the legal interventions of public authorities began on 4 March 2020. It is 
first the Minister of health who implemented several measures3, namely about mass 
gatherings. They were completed on 14 March 20204. Then, the Prime Minister got 
involved with a decree on 16 March 20205 enacting the lockdown. Following the adoption 
of the state of health emergency (see further), he enacted a new decree on 23 March 20206, 
with a comprehensive scope. The text changed on multiple occasions. 
 
3 Arrêté portant diverses mesures relatives à la lutte contre la propagation du virus covid-
19, 4 March 2020. 
4 Arrêté du 14 mars 2020 portant diverses mesures relatives à la lutte contre la propagation 
du virus covid-19, 14 March 2020. 
5 Décret n° 2020-260 portant réglementation des déplacements dans le cadre de la lutte 
contre la propagation du virus covid-19, 26 March 2020. 
6 Décret n° 2020-293 prescrivant les mesures générales nécessaires pour faire face à 
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The Parliament extended the state of emergency on 11 May until 10 July7. Then, a new 
decree replaced the decree of 23 March 20208. The procedure about religious ceremonies 
targeted this decree. On 31 May, the Prime Minister abrogated this decree and replaced it 
by a new one9. The decision concerning freedom of demonstration concerned this last 
decree. Other evolutions continued during the pandemic. 
In Belgium, the ministerial decree (arrêté ministériel) of 13 March 2020 activated the 
'federal phase'10, which meant that the federal level managed the crisis. Consequently, the 
Minister of Interior had the competence to adopt measures at the national level to contain 
the crisis. He took the first decisions on the same day11. A new ministerial decree replaced 
them on 18 March 202012, which initiated the lockdown. Then, a new ministerial decree 
 
7Loi n° 2020-546 prorogeant l'état d'urgence sanitaire et complétant ses dispositions, 11 
May 2020. 
8 Décret n° 2020-548 prescrivant les mesures générales nécessaires pour faire face à 
l'épidémie de covid-19 dans le cadre de l'état d'urgence sanitaire, 11 May 2020. 
9 Décret n° 2020-663 prescrivant les mesures générales nécessaires pour faire face à 
l'épidémie de covid-19 dans le cadre de l'état d'urgence sanitaire, 31 May 2020. 
10 Arrêté ministériel portant le déclenchement de la phase fédérale concernant la 
coordination et la gestion de la crise coronavirus COVID-19, 13 March 2020. 
11 Arrêté ministériel portant des mesures d'urgence pour limiter la propagation du 
coronavirus COVID-19, 13 March 2020. 
12 Arrêté ministériel portant des mesures d'urgence pour limiter la propagation du 
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was adopted on 23 March 202013, which clarified the rules. The Minister of Interior 
amended the decree on several occasions, namely on 30 April 2020, when the Government 
announced a strategy of 'déconfinement'14. The decision about freedom of religion 
concerned this decree, as modified by a decree of 15 May 202015. The Minister finally 
abrogated this decree at the end of June16. He enacted other ministerial decrees throughout 
the pandemic. In particular, it is worth underlining that French and Belgian authorities 
adopted several measures at the end of 2020 to curb a second epidemic wave. 
2.2. Facts  
After this short presentation of the legal context presiding to the health emergency, this 
section introduces the facts of the cases judged by the two Councils of State. The facts are 
similar in France and Belgium. The section exposes first the facts of the French cases, then 
the circumstances surrounding the Belgian decisions. 
Based on the state of emergency above-mentioned, the French Prime Minister adopted 
a decree, stating that any public gathering or activity involving more than ten people for 
 
13 Arrêté ministériel portant des mesures d'urgence pour limiter la propagation du 
coronavirus COVID-19, 23 March 2020. 
14 Arrêté ministériel modifiant l'arrêté ministériel du 23 mars 2020 portant des mesures 
d'urgence pour limiter la propagation du coronavirus COVID-19, 30 April 2020. 
15 Arrêté ministériel modifiant l'arrêté ministériel du 23 mars 2020 portant des mesures 
d'urgence pour limiter la propagation du coronavirus COVID-19, 15 May 2020. 
16 Arrêté ministériel portant des mesures d'urgence pour limiter la propagation du 
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non-professional reasons was forbidden17. The decree provided an exception for the 
gatherings and activities that were 'essential to the continuity of the nation's life'. Several 
unions and a human rights association asked the Council of State to suspend this decree 
because it did not provide an exception for 'demonstrations and gatherings aiming at the 
collective expression of ideas and opinions'18. At the time the Council of State decided on 
this legal challenge, several demonstrations were taking place against police violence and 
racism19. 
Concerning the prohibition of religious ceremonies, many individuals and Christian 
associations launched the procedure. The decree adopted on 11 May, replacing the decree 
from 23 March, provided that churches and other religious buildings might remain open, 
but that any gathering or meeting was forbidden, except for funerals20. 
In Belgium, a claimant who was part of a group called 'La santé en luttes' composed of 
medical and administrative workers from health institutions initiated the proceedings 
against the prohibition of demonstrations. The group wished to organise on Sunday 14 June 
a demonstration of about 200-250 people in front of the federal ministry of health21.  
 
17 Council of State (France), nr. 440846, 440856 and 441015, 13 June 2020, § 4. 
18 Council of State (France), nr. 440846, 440856 and 441015, 13 June 2020, § 5. 
19 Le Monde avec AFP, 'Le Conseil d’Etat rétablit la liberté de manifester, dans le respect 
des mesures barrières', Le Monde, 13 June 2020, 
https://www.lemonde.fr/societe/article/2020/06/13/le-conseil-d-etat-retablit-la-liberte-de-
manifester-dans-le-respect-des-mesures-barrieres_6042766_3224.html, (accessed 29 
October 2020). 
20 Council of State (France), nr. 440366 and others, 18 May 2020, § 22. 
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However, the police informed the claimant on Friday 12 June that the demonstration could 
not take place due to the measures adopted by the municipal authorities22. Following the 
guidelines of the federal Minister of Interior, the city of Brussels had decided not to allow 
the demonstration. At that time, the ministerial decree provided that no gathering involving 
more than twenty people was allowed. Demonstrations were thus forbidden in Belgium. 
Concerning the cancellation of religious ceremonies, the Belgian claimants wanted to 
suspend (and cancel) article 3 of the ministerial decree of 23 March, as amended by the 
ministerial decree dating from 15 May23. This article forbade religious ceremonies and 
provided three exceptions: funerals, weddings and broadcasted ceremonies. In the first two 
situations, thirty people might attend the ceremony. In the latter, ten people were allowed, 
including the ones responsible for broadcasting. The prohibition was applicable from 18 
May until 7 June. This article replaced article 5 of the ministerial decree of 23 March, 
which also prohibited religious ceremonies24. 
 
2.3. Two Councils of State, two sets of procedural rules 
This section examines the procedural rules applicable to the legal challenges. In 
Belgium, the Council of State has the power to suspend the execution of an administrative 
act if two conditions are satisfied25. First, at least one argument must be serious enough to 
justify, at first sight, the annulment of the administrative act. This condition implies that the 
 
22 Council of State (Belgium), nr. 247.790, 14 June 2020, § 4. 
23 Arrêté ministériel modifiant l'arrêté ministériel du 23 mars 2020 portant des mesures 
d'urgence pour limiter la propagation du coronavirus COVID-19, 15 May 2020. 
24 Council of State (Belgium), nr. 247.674, 28 May 2020, § 3. 
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argument must seem admissible and display illegality that could lead to the cancellation of 
the act26. Second, there must be an emergency that is incompatible with the cancellation 
procedure. Two elements compose this condition27. On the one hand, the execution of the 
administrative act would cause the claimant damage of some gravity. On the other hand, the 
standard procedure would not prevent this damage from happening.  
Under the procedure of extreme emergency, the law further requires that the claimant 
demonstrates that the emergency is such that it is incompatible with the processing time of 
a suspension procedure28. As underlined by Michel Leroy, 'the administrative referee 
constitutes a substantial progression of the rule of law'29. Thanks to this procedure, the 
Council of State can adopt decisions that have a practical impact in a short time.  
Regarding the emergency, this condition replaced in 2014 the previous requirement of 
severe damage that is difficult to repair30. The emergency still implies the risk of damage, 
but it is not clear whether it should be severe enough or irreparable31. Additionally, the 
 
26 J. Jaumotte and E. Thibaut, Le Conseil d’Etat de Belgique, t. 2, Bruxelles, Bruylant, 
2012, p. 1536. 
27 See for example: Council of State (Belgium), nr. 247.585, 19 May 2005. 
28 Lois coordonnées sur le Conseil d’Etat, 12 January 1973, art. 17, § 4. 
29 M. Leroy, Contentieux administratif, 5fth ed., Limal, Anthémis, 2011, p. 165. 
30 Loi portant réforme de la compétence, de la procédure et de l'organisation du Conseil 
d'État, 20 January 2014, art. 6. 
31 M. Vanderstraeten and F. Tulkens, 'Urgence, extrême urgence, mesures provisoires et 
balance des intérêts devant le Conseil d’Etat', in F. Viseur and J. Philippart (eds.), La justice 
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emergency condition is not fulfilled by the sole circumstance that the cancellation decision 
will intervene too late32. 
If the case meets these conditions, the suspension of the administrative act is not 
automatic. If the adverse party requests it, the Council of State must balance all competing 
interests to decide if the suspension would not cause more significant damage33. When the 
procedure is that of extreme emergency, the claimant must also demonstrate that he has 
acted diligently to prevent the damage from happening and to initiate the proceedings34. 
The organisation of administrative justice is different in France. In contrast to Belgium, 
there is a coherent hierarchical set of administrative jurisdictions, spearheaded by the 
Council of State. The Council of State judges only 20% of the cases in first instance, 
including the procedures against a decree35. It makes sense that the Council of State is 
competent and not a local administrative court of first instance with a limited territorial 
jurisdiction, considering the national scope of a decree36. Such text is also particularly 
critical since it emanates from the highest administrative authorities of the State.  
 
32 See for example: Council of State (Belgium), nr. 229.477, 8 December 2014; Council of 
State (Belgium), nr. 227.963, 2 July 2014. 
33 M. Leroy, Contentieux administratif, 5th ed., Limal, Anthémis, 2011, pp. 772-773. 
34 M. Leroy, Contentieux administratif, 5th ed., Limal, Anthémis, 2011, p. 791. 
35 J. Waline, Droit administratif, 22nd ed., Paris, Dalloz, 2008, p. 575. See also: Code de 
justice administrative, art. R. 311-1. 
36 P. Gonod, F. Melleray and P. Yolka, Traité de droit administratif, t. 2, Paris, Dalloz, 
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Concerning the decisions analysed, the procedure used in front of the French Council 
of State is the 'référé liberté'37. This procedure is available on three conditions: first, 
emergency justifies the action; second, a fundamental freedom is violated by a public legal 
person or by a private person in charge of a public service; third, the infringement is serious 
and illegal38. 
Therefore, the conditions governing the legal actions in France and Belgium are 
broadly similar. They share the requirement of emergency. The criterium of illegality seems 
stricter in France since the illegality must be manifest, while the Belgian procedure only 
requires illegality susceptible to lead a cancellation. Finally, the French administrative 
justice code requires a severe infringement of a fundamental right. In Belgium, any damage 
of enough gravity suffices. 
2.4. The prohibition of demonstrations  
Based on the facts and procedures described hereabove, this section exposes the 
reasoning of the French and Belgian Councils of State concerning freedom of 
demonstration. The section begins with the French case and follows with the Belgium one. 
While the French institution relies heavily on the proportionality test, the Belgian Council 
of State focuses on the emergency condition. 
2.4.a. In France 
As a foundation of its reasoning, the Council of State mentions that freedom of 
expression is a human right guaranteed by the Constitution and the European Convention of 
Human Rights. However, the State must conciliate it with the public order and the 
 
37 J. Waline, Droit administratif, 22nd ed., Paris, Dalloz, 2008, p. 631. 
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protection of health39. The Government brings forward two arguments to justify the 
prohibition of demonstrations. First, it would be complicated to enforce the physical 
distancing (mesures barrières) during demonstrations. Second, since the ban applies only to 
demonstrations involving more than ten people, and that the prefect (state representative at 
the local level) can provide derogations, the measure is not general or disproportionate40. 
The Council of State acknowledges that it may be more challenging to enforce the 
mesures barrières during demonstrations. However, it considers that nothing shows that a 
demonstration would be impossible everywhere in France, whichever form the 
demonstration may take41. Furthermore, the possibility of derogation has not been used, 
notwithstanding the numerous demonstrations held after the enactment of the ban42. Finally, 
demonstrations are in any case subject to a declaration system. The administrative 
authorities have the power to prohibit any demonstration that could disturb public order, 
which includes public health. According to the criminal code, any person participating in a 
 
39 Council of State (France), nr. 440846, 440856 and 441015, 13 June 2020, § 10. 
According to the Constitutional Council, the state of health emergency is linked to the 
objective of protection of health inscribed in the preamble to the Constitution of 1946. See: 
P. Rrapi, 'Le Préambule de la Constitution de 1946, fondement constitutionnel de l’état 
d’urgence', La Revue des Droits de l'Homme, 2020, 
http://journals.openedition.org/revdh/9466 (accessed 9 November 2020). 
40 Council of State (France), nr. 440846, 440856 and 441015, 13 June 2020, § 12. 
41 Council of State (France), nr. 440846, 440856 and 441015, 13 June 2020, §§ 13-14. 
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forbidden demonstration can be fined (art. R-644-4). The Council of State considers thus 
that the ban is not necessary, not adequate and not proportionate43. 
As for the emergency requirement, the Council of State deems it fulfilled since several 
demonstrations were to occur in the days following the procedure44. 
2.4.b. In Belgium 
As a reminder, the coordinated laws on the Council of State (lois coordonnées sur le 
Conseil d’État) require two elements to suspend the execution of an administrative decision 
under the emergency procedure. On the one hand, an emergency that is incompatible with 
the treatment of the case under the cancellation procedure. On the other hand, the claim 
must display at least one serious argument45. In the case at hand, the Council of State says 
that the claimant must show that the execution of the administrative act would cause 
inconveniences of such gravity that their consequences would be irreversible46. Besides, the 
emergency depends on the interests invoked by the claimant47. 
Furthermore, under the extreme emergency procedure, the claimant must demonstrate 
that the ordinary emergency procedure would be incompatible with the resolution of the 
case and that he has acted diligently to launch the procedure. In any case, the extreme 
emergency procedure must remain exceptional, since it severely diminishes the procedural 
 
43 Council of State (France), nr. 440846, 440856 and 441015, 13 June 2020, § 17. 
44 Council of State (France), nr. 440846, 440856 and 441015, 13 June 2020, § 18. 
45 Council of State (Belgium), nr. 247.790, 14 June 2020, § 10. 
46 Council of State (Belgium), nr. 247.790, 14 June 2020, § 11. 
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rights of the parties48. In the case at hand, the Council of State observes that the claimant 
introduced his action on 13 June. The claimant received the decision on 12 June, and the 
demonstration was supposed to occur on 14 June. It is therefore clear that the ordinary 
suspension procedure would not have intervened in due time49. 
Even if the inconveniences concern fundamental rights, the Council of State does not 
automatically consider them severe50 , which is in line with its previous case law. Indeed, 
the claimant does not argue that the date chosen for the manifestation is of particular 
significance51. Moreover, the Council observes that the measures provided by the 
ministerial decree are applicable until 30 June, unless the Minister extends them52. They are 
thus evolutive. Therefore, the Council considers that the prohibition does not durably, 
severely and irreversibly harm the fundamental right to gathering and demonstration, since 
other ways of expression exist53. According to the Council of State, the inconvenience is 
not severe enough. 
The reasoning of the Council of State raises several criticisms. First, the prohibition of 
the demonstration is not isolated. It has an impact on the whole territory of Belgium and not 
only in Brussels, where the claimant intended to manifest. Indeed, it is the inevitable 
consequence of the ministerial decree, which forbade all gatherings of more than twenty 
 
48 Council of State (Belgium), nr. 247.790, 14 June 2020, § 12. 
49 Council of State (Belgium), nr. 247.790, 14 June 2020, § 10. 
50 Council of State (Belgium), nr. 247.790, 14 June 2020, § 12. 
51 Council of State (Belgium), nr. 247.790, 14 June 2020, § 13. 
52 Council of State (Belgium), nr. 247.790, 14 June 2020, § 13. 
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people. Nevertheless, the Belgian case pertained formally to one demonstration, while the 
French one directly concerned the general prohibition established by the decree. Second, 
the effects of the decision last for several weeks and cannot be limited to a single event. 
Third, there is no derogatory procedure to allow demonstrations. Fourth, the demonstration 
concerned a central public debate, especially during the COVID-19 crisis. Indeed, the 
demonstration aimed at defending the interests of healthcare workers. Furthermore, the 
demonstration was even more critical because political negotiations to form a federal 
government had resumed. Finally, a proportionality test could have shown, as in the French 
case, that other measures infringed less freedom of demonstration. These elements could 
have weighed more heavily in the balance. 
2.5. The cancellation of religious ceremonies  
Having compared the reasoning of the Councils of State regarding freedom of 
demonstration, this section engages with freedom of religion. It presents first how the 
French Council of State dealt with the ban on religious ceremonies. The analysis of the 
Belgian case follows. As underlined hereafter, timing is important in these cases. Indeed, 
both Councils of State have pronounced different decisions on the same question during the 
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2.5.a. In France54 
While the Belgian Council of State decides that the emergency condition was not 
satisfied, the French Council of State deems if fulfilled. The French Council of State 
observes indeed that no religious ceremony has occurred since 23 March, which bears 
severe consequences. Believers have not been able to practise their religion collectively for 
several weeks. Besides, the main religions present in France hold essential celebrations 
during the spring. For these reasons, the Council of State declares that 'considering the 
improvement of the sanitary situation which has justified the déconfinement, the condition 
of characterised emergency (…) must be deemed fulfilled'55. In an earlier decision dating 
from 24 March 2020, the Council of State had judged otherwise that there was no 
emergency56. However, this decision was pronounced at the worst stage of the pandemic, 
when a complete lockdown was applicable. 
Notwithstanding the finding of an emergency, it does not follow automatically that the 
prohibition is illegal. According to the French Council of State, the risk of contamination is 
higher during religious ceremonies since they are held inside, involve numerous people, 
and imply songs, prayers and ritual movements57. It results that it is necessary to regulate 
 
54 On this case, see: M. Nihoul, S. Wattier and F. Xavier, 'L’art de la juste mesure dans la 
lutte contre le coronavirus face à la dimension collective de la liberté de culte', Rev. trim. 
D.H., 2020, pp. 1029-1063 ; J. Fialaire, 'Liberté de culte et urgence sanitaire : les leçons de 
la jurisprudence', La semaine juridique, nr. 21-22, pp. 38-43. 
55 Council of State (France), nr. 440366 and others, 18 May 2020, § 24. 
56 Council of State (France), nr. 439694, 24 March 2020. 
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the access to religious ceremonies which 'cannot be considered similar to securing the 
access to basic goods and services'58. 
The judge underlines that the rules applicable to several other activities are less rigid. 
However, they do not necessarily involve a risk equivalent to the one existing during 
religious ceremonies59. Public transports, libraries, shopping malls, schools and shops are 
allowed to open during the déconfinement. Decidedly, the fundamental rights involved in 
these places are not the same60. The Council of State does not indicate, however, if it judges 
that religious activities are more important than commercial or educational ones. Finally, 
the French Council observes that the prohibition has been adopted only to avoid risky 
activities, but without regard to the potential difficulty to adopt measures ensuring 
distancing or to the ability of the religious authorities to enforce them61. 
The French Council of State concludes that the prohibition of religious ceremonies is 
not proportionate and constitutes a severe and manifest violation of the freedom of 
religion62. The Council of State carried out a true test of proportionality, weighing the 
interests at stake and the concrete possibility to enforce physical distancing. 
 
 
58 Council of State (France), nr. 440366 and others, 18 May 2020, § 29. 
59 Council of State (France), nr. 440366 and others, 18 May 2020, § 31. 
60 Council of State (France), nr. 440366 and others, 18 May 2020, § 32. 
61 Council of State (France), nr. 440366 and others, 18 May 2020, § 33. 
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However, at the end of its reasoning, the Council of State seems to indicate that places 
of worship63 and private or public places dedicated to religious activities do not enjoy the 
same protection64. Even if the decision of the French Council of State accepts the demand 
of the claimants, the impact of the decision was probably small because it arrived late65. At 
best, believers gained a few days66. 
        2.5.b. In Belgium 
The analysis now shifts towards the Belgian case. The Council of State mentions first 
that it can grant a suspension based on the extreme emergency on two conditions: a serious 
argument and an emergency such that the Council cannot rule the case under the habitual 
 
63 Such as churches, synagogues and mosques.  
64 B. Mérand, 'Liberté des cultes : la décision ambivalente du Conseil d’État du 18 mai 
2020', Actu juridique, 6 August 2020, https://www.actu-juridique.fr/administratif/liberte-
des-cultes-la-decision-ambivalente-du-conseil-detat-du-18-mai-2020/, (accessed 28 
October 2020). 
65 R. Letteron, 'Covid-19 : Le Conseil d'Etat arrive en retard', Liberté, Libertés chéries, 19 
May 2020, http://libertescheries.blogspot.com/2020/05/covid-19-le-conseil-detat-arrive-
en.html (accessed 29 October 2020). 
66 The opportunity of this claim was not unanimously shared by the religious communities. 
It seems that only the catholic cult, especially its radical branch, wished to hold religious 
ceremonies before the 2 June, which was the date announced by the Government. See: B. 
Sauvaget, 'Les cultes accueillent avec prudence la décision du Conseil d'Etat', Libération, 
19 May 2020, https://www.liberation.fr/france/2020/05/19/les-cultes-accueillent-avec-
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procedure of emergency67. In this regard, in the Belgian case like in the French one, the 
claimants have not immediately protested against the prohibition of religious ceremonies. 
The procedure targets the ministerial decree of the 15 May, which confirms the prohibition, 
while other activities are allowed. 
The Council of State also adds that the extreme emergency procedure must remain 
exceptional68. For this reason, the claimant cannot successfully invoke the extreme 
emergency procedure if he has waited passively before the introduction of his claim69. The 
Council of State considers that the claimants should have acted earlier. Following its 
analysis, it should have been clear from the 24 April, date of the announcement of the 
'déconfinement', that religious ceremonies would not be allowed before June70. However, 
this reasoning would lead to the consequence that a claimant must immediately attack a 
measure, even though it may be proportionate in the first place71. 
Then, the Council of State holds reasoning similar to the one followed in the case 
pertaining to freedom of demonstration. According to the administrative court, a violation 
of freedom of religion does not automatically constitute 'an urgent matter of public 
 
67 Council of State (Belgium), nr. 247.674, 28 May 2020, § 5. 
68 Council of State (Belgium), nr. 247.674, 28 May 2020, § 7. 
69 Council of State (Belgium), nr. 247.674, 28 May 2020, § 7. 
70 Council of State (Belgium), nr. 247.674, 28 May 2020, § 9. 




Copyleft – Ius Publicum 
20 
interest'72. The violation of freedom of religion does not concern the emergency condition 
but the requirement of a serious argument73.  
In addition, the Council of State pays attention to an argument of the Government. 
According to it, even if a decision allowing religious ceremonies was adopted, there would 
not be enough time to take measures sufficient enough to ensure the protection of the 
public74. This argument is quite noteworthy since it underlines that it is possible to organise 
religious ceremonies with proper distancing measures. By comparison, the French Council 
of State referred to official scientific guidelines to determine that distancing measures were 
possible during religious ceremonies. 
The Council of State also refers to the fact that the bishops of Belgium have agreed that 
baptisms should take place when the general déconfinement happens75. Finally, the Council 
relies on the dialogue maintained by the Government with the representatives of the 
different religions to dismiss the argument saying that the Government neglects the rights 
of believers76. In particular, the Government announced that it would discuss the question 
of religious ceremonies on 3 June77. 
 
 
72 Council of State (Belgium), nr. 247.674, 28 May 2020, § 8. 
73 Council of State (Belgium), nr. 247.674, 28 May 2020, § 8. 
74 Council of State (Belgium), nr. 247.674, 28 May 2020, § 10.  
75 Council of State (Belgium), nr. 247.674, 28 May 2020, § 12. 
76 Council of State (Belgium), nr. 247.674, 28 May 2020, § 12. 
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The assessment of the Council of State entails several criticisms. First, one can wonder 
whether the proportionality test required was robust enough. Indeed, the Council of State 
could have judged that appropriate distancing measures, such as the wearing of a mask, 
physical distance between people attending the ceremonies and the prohibition of certain 
ritual aspects (for instance the Eucharist) were sufficient to attain the legitimate goal of 
impeding the propagation of the COVID-19. Retrospectively, the ministerial decree of 18 
October seems to confirm this thesis. Indeed, while this decree is adopted in a context 
characterised by a rapid increase of the contaminations and admissions to the hospital of 
people infected by the COVID-19, the decree maintains the churches open on the 
conditions that no more than forty people attend the ceremony and that a facial mask is 
worn78. Ten days later, the ministerial decree of 28 October reiterates the same rules79. It is 
only on 1 November that religious ceremonies are again prohibited80. 
Second, should a violation of a fundamental right not be an urgent matter? Especially 
as, in this case, it is a right which is at the core of freedom of religion that is restricted (see 
further). As the paper explains further, the Belgian Council of State does not depart from its 
previous case law here. On this matter, the French Council of State took a completely 
different position than the Belgian Council of State.  
 
 
78 Arrêté ministériel portant des mesures d’urgence pour limiter la propagation du 
coronavirus COVID-19, 18 October 2020, art. 20.  
79 Arrêté ministériel portant des mesures d'urgence pour limiter la propagation du 
coronavirus COVID-19, 28 October 2020, art. 17. 
80 Arrêté ministériel modifiant l’arrêté ministériel du 28 octobre 2020 portant des mesures 
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Third, the argument of the evolutive nature of the decisions works both ways. The 
Council of State used this argument to dismiss the emergency. However, it could also have 
considered that the evolutive nature of the measures does not offer any guarantee nor 
predictability about the possibility to hold religious ceremonies shortly. 
Fourth, while the lockdown was general and targeted every activity, economic or not, 
the déconfinement led to differentiated measures, that the principle of equality and of non-
discrimination can question. Understandably, they generate a feeling of injustice in the 
mind of the people whose demands (or hopes) are ignored81. The balance also requires 
weighing the importance of freedom of religion against other fundamental rights, such as 
freedom of enterprise, which is guaranteed by international conventions82 and by national 
provisions83. In this respect, one can wonder whether freedom of religion and freedom of 
enterprise received equal treatment. 
 
81 M. Nihoul, S. Wattier and F. Xavier, 'L’art de la juste mesure dans la lutte contre le 
coronavirus face à la dimension collective de la liberté de culte', Rev. trim. D.H., 2020, pp. 
1058-1059. 
82 The European Convention on Human Rights does not explicitly protect freedom of 
enterprise. However, companies enjoy several human rights. On this subject, see: P. Oliver, 
'Companies and their fundamental rights: a comparative perspective', I.C.L.Q., vol. 64, 
2015, pp. 661-696; M. Teller, 'Les droits de l’homme de l’entreprise', in L. Boy, J.-B. 
Racine and F. Siiriainen (coord.), Droit économique et droits de l’homme, Bruxelles, 
Larcier, 2009, pp. 257-268. In European Union law, the freedom of enterprise is protected 
by article 16 of the Charter of fundamental rights, which states that: 'the freedom to conduct 
a business in accordance with Community law and national laws and practices is 
recognised'. 
83 In Belgium, freedom of enterprise is protected by articles II.3 and II.3 of the Economic 
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3.  LEGAL CONTEXT 
As underlined before, the reasoning of the two Councils of State examined whether the 
restriction of a fundamental right constituted an emergency and was illegal. This first 
section presents the international provisions applying in Belgium and France to understand 
the scope and limits of freedom of religion and freedom of demonstration. The second 
section analyses national constitutional provisions. Subsequently, the third section carries 
out a brief comparison of the two Councils of State to highlight the differences between the 
institutions. 
3.1. The same international protections 
France and Belgium have two similar systems of protection of fundamental rights. 
Both countries have signed the European Convention on Human Rights and are subject to 
the jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights. However, the European 
Convention on Human Rights is part of the 'bloc de constitutionnalité' in France, but not in 
 
France, the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Council bases freedom of enterprise on 
articles 2 and 17 of the Déclaration des droits de l'homme et du citoyen. On this subject, 
see: T. Léonard (coord.), La liberté d’entreprendre ou le retour en force d’un fondamental 
du droit économique, Bruxelles, Bruylant, 2015; V. Audubert, 'La liberté d’entreprendre et 
le Conseil constitutionnel : un principe réellement tout puissant ?', Revue des droits de 
l'homme, nr. 18, 2020, http://journals.openedition.org/revdh/9921 (accessed 29 October 
2020); R. Ergec, 'La liberté de commerce et d'industrie à l'aune de la jurisprudence 
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Belgium. The Constitutional Court has thus developed a method to interpret articles of the 
Belgian Constitution in light of the European Convention on Human Rights84. 
Regarding freedom of religion, article 9 provides that:  
'1) Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right 
includes freedom to change his religion or belief and freedom, either alone or in community 
with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief, in worship, teaching, 
practice and observance.  
2) Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such 
limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the 
interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or for the 
protection of the rights and freedoms of others'. 
Contrarily to the Constitutions of France and Belgium, the European Convention 
explicitly allows the limitation of religious freedom for health reasons. Article 9 provides 
three guarantees: 'the freedom of thought, conscience, and religion as such; the freedom to 
change one's religion or belief; and the freedom to manifest religion or belief'85. Freedom of 
religion is 'one of the most vital elements that go to make up the identity of believers and 
their conception of life, but it is also a precious asset for atheists, agnostics, sceptics and the 
 
84 On this question, see: S. Wattier, 'The « Added Value » of the European Convention on 
Human Rights in the Ambit of Religious Freedom and Religious Autonomy in Belgian 
Constitutional Case Law', R.I.E.J., 2016/2, pp. 297-317. 
85 W.A. Schabas, The European Convention of Human Rights. A Commentary, Oxford 
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unconcerned. The pluralism indissociable from a democratic society, which has been dearly 
won over the centuries, depends on it'86. 
The most relevant case judged by the European Court of Human Rights about an 
interference based on health reasons concerns the wearing of religious symbols87. Ms 
Chaplin was a Christian nurse who wished to wear a cross on a chain during her work. The 
hospital asked her to remove it for safety reasons, but she refused. A discrimination trial 
followed, which she lost, and Ms Chaplin decided to appeal to the European Court of 
Human Rights. In this case, the Court considered that there was no violation of article 9, 
since 'the protection of health and safety on a hospital ward, was inherently of a greater 
magnitude'88 than her right to manifest her religious beliefs. The Court judged that the 
measures were proportionate. In particular, the hospital had offered two possibilities to 
manifest her belief: wearing a cross in the form of a brooch or a necklace covered by a 
high-necked top under her uniform89. 
The European Court has recognised that freedom of religion includes the right to 
assemble and pray in community: an interference in this freedom implies an interference in 
article 11 interpreted in the light of article 990. More specifically, the Court has judged that 
 
86 ECHR, Kokkinakis v. Greece, 25 May 1993, § 31. 
87 ECHR, Eweida and others v. The United Kingdom, 15 January 2013. 
88 ECHR, Eweida and others v. The United Kingdom, 15 January 2013, § 99. 
89 ECHR, Eweida and others v. The United Kingdom, 15 January 2013, § 98. However, the 
second option did not really allow Ms Chaplin to manifest her beliefs to other people, but 
only to herself.  
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if a religious community has no place to practise its faith, freedom of religion loses all its 
substance91. 
While freedom of religion can be exercised individually, like Ms Chaplin, or 
collectively, freedom of demonstration is only collective. Regarding the protection of 
freedom of demonstration, article 11 states that:  
'1) Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and to freedom of 
association with others, including the right to form and to join trade unions for the 
protection of his interests.  
2) No restrictions shall be placed on the exercise of these rights other than such as are 
prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national 
security or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health 
or morals or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others (…)'. 
Article 11 is intimately linked to articles 9 and 10 of the Convention. Indeed, 'although 
its scope extends well beyond the exercise of the freedoms of assembly and association in 
the exercise of freedom of religion and expression, the visceral connection is undeniable'92. 
According to the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, 'any measures 
interfering with the freedom of assembly and expression other than in cases of incitement to 
violence or rejection of democratic principles – however shocking and unacceptable certain 
views or words used may appear to the authorities – do a disservice to democracy'93.  
 
91 ECHR, Affaire association de solidarité avec les témoins de Jéhovah c. Turquie, 24 May 
2016, § 90. 
92 W.A. Schabas, The European Convention of Human Rights. A Commentary, Oxford 
University Press, 2015, p. 491. 
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However, the Court accepts that a State uses an authorisation system or a notification 
procedure when people want to exercise their right to demonstration94. As underlined 
hereafter, these systems apply in Belgium and France. The Court also judges that the 
exceptions to freedom of gathering must be strictly interpreted and that States must justify 
them convincingly95. The proportionality analysis is paramount and requires that there are 
no 'effective, less intrusive measures available to attain the said aims in a proportionate 
manner'96. 
The situations leading to the decisions of the Councils of State are conflicts of rights. 
Indeed, freedom of religion and freedom of demonstration can be opposed to the right to 
life, guaranteed by article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights. This right 
compels the State to take appropriate measures to avoid predictable deaths97. However, 
 
94 ECHR, Güneri and others v. Turkey, 12 July 2005, § 79; ECHR, Balçik and others v. 
Turkey, 29 November 2007, § 49. 
95 ECHR, Kudrevicius and others v. Latvia, 15 October 2015, § 142. 
96 ECHR, Schwabe and M.G. v. Germany, 1 December 2011, § 118. 
97 For the ECHR, 'bearing in mind the difficulties in policing modern societies, the 
unpredictability of human conduct and the operational choices which must be made in 
terms of priorities and resources, the scope of the positive obligation must be interpreted in 
a way which does not impose an impossible or disproportionate burden on the authorities. 
Not every claimed risk to life, therefore, can entail for the authorities a Convention 
requirement to take operational measures to prevent that risk from materialising' (ECHR, 
Olewnik-Cieplińska and Olewnik v. Poland, 5 September 2019, § 119). See also: F. 
Bouhon et. al., 'L’État belge face à la pandémie de Covid-19 : esquisse d’un régime 




Copyleft – Ius Publicum 
28 
States must tailor the measures to the level of risk98. There are lots of circumstances or 
human activities that entail a risk of death, but they do not mean that the State is free to 
adopt any measure to prevent them. The test of proportionality limits the measures that the 
authorities can adopt. 
In this regard, the President of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe 
has insisted on the proportionality test in the fight against the coronavirus: 'I should like to 
stress that the overarching principle of proportionality limits the action that may be taken, 
via the stringent test of what is "strictly required by the exigencies of the situation"'99. As 
underlined previously, this principle appears in the jurisprudence of the French Council of 
State, but not in the reasoning of the Belgian Council of State. 
Finally, neither Belgium nor France has invoked article 15 of the European Convention 
of Human Rights. According to article 15, States can derogate from particular articles of the 
Convention, including articles 9 and 11, in a situation of war or other danger to the life of 
the nation100. The rights concerned are 'derogable'101. The Court described the danger to the 
 
98 ECHR, Öneryildiz v. Turkey, 30 November 2004, § 90. 
99 Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, COVID-19: President urges states to 
abide by the ECHR when responding to the crisis, 24 March 2020, 
https://pace.coe.int/en/news/7825 (accessed 27 October 2020). 
100 Article 15, § 1, of the European Convention on Human Rights states that: 'in  time  of  
war  or  other  public  emergency  threatening  the  life of the nation any High Contracting 
Party may take measures derogating from its obligations under this Convention to the 
extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation, provided that such measures are 
not inconsistent with its other obligations under international law'. See: C. Nivard, 'Le 
respect de la Convention européenne des droits de l’homme en temps de crise sanitaire 
mondiale', La Revue des Droits de l'Homme, 2020, 
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life of the nation as 'an exceptional situation of crisis or emergency which affects the whole 
population and constitutes a threat to the organised life of the community of which the State 
is composed'102. It seems that article 15 had never been used previously in the context of a 
pandemic103. For Belgium and France, usual rules remain fully applicable. 
3.2. Constitutional guarantees that differ slightly 
After the international protections, the paper compares the constitutional provisions 
applicable in France and Belgium. The Belgian Constitution protects freedom of religion 
through three articles. Article 19 addresses the positive aspect of freedom of religion: 
people have the right to adhere to a religion and to manifest their belief104. Article 20 
protects the 'negative side' of the freedom of religion: people cannot be forced to believe or 
 
juste équilibre : les limitations aux droits de l’homme en période de crise sanitaire 
(Première partie)', La Revue des Droits de l'Homme, 2020, 
http://journals.openedition.org/revdh/10551 (accessed 9 November 2020). 
101 On this question, see: A. Greene, Emergency Powers in a Time of Pandemic, Bristol 
University Press, 2020, pp. 61-92. 
102 ECHR, Lawless v. Ireland, 1st July 1961, § 28. 
103 M. Nihoul, S. Wattier and F. Xavier, 'L’art de la juste mesure dans la lutte contre le 
coronavirus face à la dimension collective de la liberté de culte', Rev. trim. D.H., 2020, p. 
1052. 
104 Article 19 states that: 'freedom of religion, freedom to practise it in public, as well as the 
freedom to express one's opinions in all matters, are guaranteed, except for the repression of 
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to participate in religious activities if they do not wish to105. Article 21 forbids the State to 
intervene in the nomination of ministers of religion, which courts and doctrine equate to the 
protection of the organisational autonomy of religions106. 
As for France, the Constitution of 1958 contains no bill of rights. However, the 
preamble refers to the human rights proclaimed by the Déclaration des droits de l'homme et 
du citoyen of 1789 and by the preamble of the 1946 Constitution. The article 10 of the 1789 
Declaration protects freedom of religion in such terms that its only limit is public order107. 
Thus, France and Belgium protect freedom of religion broadly, even if they do not 
share the same conception of 'secularism'. The French system is famous for its principle of 
'laïcité'108. Under this understanding, the 1905 law about the separation of Church and State 
 
105 Article 20 provides that: 'no one can be compelled in any way to take part to the acts and 
ceremonies of a cult, nor to observe its days of rest'. 
106 Article 21, § 1, reads as follows: 'the State has no right to interfere in the appointment or 
installation of ministers of any religion, nor to forbid them to correspond with their 
superiors, and to publish their acts, except, in the latter case, the ordinary liability for the 
press and publication'. See: S. Wattier, Le financement public des cultes et des 
organisations philosophiques non confessionnelles : analyse de constitutionnalité et de 
conventionnalité, Bruxelles, Larcier, 2016, pp. 188-198. 
107 Article 10 of the 1789 Declaration proclaims that: 'no one should be worried about his 
opinions, even religious, as long as their manifestation does not disturb the public order 
established by the law'. 
108 On this subject, see: F. Messner, P.-H. Prélot and J.-M. Woehrling (eds.), Droit français 
des religions, 2nd edn, Paris, LexisNexis, 2013; D. Koussens, L'épreuve de la neutralité, 
Bruxelles, Bruylant, 2015; E. Daly, 'The Ambiguous Reach of Constitutional Secularism in 
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proclaims that the French Republic does not recognise nor subsidise any religion109. By 
contrast, 'Belgium has a resolutely active conception of the principle of pluralism'110. One 
of the main differences between the two regimes is the fact that Belgium has a system of 
recognition and funding of some religions111. Article 181 of the Constitution establishes this 
regime, which is as old as the Belgian State112. For this reason, it would be incorrect to say 
that Belgium lives under a strict separation regime. Authors use terms such as the 
 
Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 2012, pp. 583-608; C. Kintzler, 'Construire 
philosophiquement le concept de laïcité. Quelques réflexions sur la constitution et le statut 
d'une théorie', Cités, 2012, pp. 51-68, M. Barthélémy and G. Michelat, 'Dimensions de la 
laïcité dans la France d’aujourd’hui', Revue française de science politique, 2007, pp. 649-
698 ; N. Baillargeon, Deux concepts de laïcité et leurs enjeux, in Laïcité et humanisme, 
Ottawa, University of Ottawa Press, 2015. 
109 Loi concernant la séparation des Eglises et de l'État, 9 December 1905, art. 2. 
110 H. Dumont, 'Conclusions', in C. Romainville et. al. (dir.), État et religions, Limal, 
Anthémis, 2016, p. 245. 
111 On this subject, see S. Wattier, Le financement public des cultes et des organisations 
philosophiques non confessionnelles : analyse de constitutionnalité et de conventionnalité, 
Bruxelles, Larcier, 2016. 
112 Article 181, § 1, of the Constitution provides that: 'the salaries and pensions of ministers 
of religion are paid by the State; the sums needed to cover them are charged annually to the 
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'independence'113, 'mutual independence'114 or 'benevolent separation'115 between Church 
and State.  
However, the differences between the two systems remain limited116. Indeed, even if 
the French political and legal discourse puts a great emphasis on the principle of laïcité, 
several elements lead to the conclusion that the separation is not as strict as it seems. For 
instance, due to the concordat signed by Napoleon, religions are funded in Alsace-oselle117. 
 
113 F. Delpérée, Le droit constitutionnel de la Belgique, Bruxelles and Paris, Bruylant and 
LGDJ, 2000, p. 231. 
114 H. Wagnon,'La condition juridique de l’Église catholique en Belgique', Ann. dr. sc. pol., 
1964, p. 72. 
115 S. Wattier, 'Le financement des cultes au XXIe siècle : Faut-il réviser l'article 181 de 
constitution ?', R.B.D.C., 2011/1, p. 25 ; L.-L. Christians, 'Le financement des cultes en 
droit belge : bilan et perspectives', Quaderna di diritto e politica ecclesiastica, 2006, p. 83; 
S. Wattier, 'Inscrire le principe de laïcité dans la Constitution belge ? Quelques pistes pour 
une réflexion juridique', Cahiers du CIRC, nr. 4, 2020, p. 80; X. Delgrange, 'Faut-il 
enchâsser la laïcité politique dans la Constitution belge ?', Cahiers du CIRC, nr. 4, 2020, p. 
12. 
116 S. Wattier, 'Entre sécularisation et retour du religieux : repenser les relations entre État et 
religions dans une Belgique paradoxale', in C. Romainville et. al. (dir.), État et religions, 
Limal, Anthémis, 2016, pp. 27-30. 
117 On this subject, see: F. Messner, 'Le droit local des cultes alsacien-mosellan au défi du 
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The principle of laïcité is not opposed to freedom of religion. On the contrary, it is 'devised 
as a means to ensure the free exercise of religion by all citizens'118.  
Nevertheless, the absence of a strict separation had an incidence in the Belgium case 
about freedom of religion. The Council of State referred to the dialogue between the State 
and the religious authorities to dismiss the claim119. Such dialogue is contrary to the French 
principle of laïcité. Still, the reference to the press release of the bishops of Belgium, 
stating that baptism could wait until the end of the lockdown, is questionable. As 
underlined by Frank Judo, this argument seems contrary to the principle that courts should 
not evaluate the content of the belief but only examine if the claimant has an opinion that is 
cogent and serious120. People are not required to follow the religious authorities of their 
faith strictly. 
Concerning freedom of demonstration, it is subject to police laws in both countries. 
According to article 26 of the Belgian Constitution, open-air gatherings are fully subject to 
the police laws121. Similarly, the French Déclaration des droits de l'homme et du citoyen 
 
118 M. Hunter-Henin, 'Why the French don’t like the burqa: laïcité, national identity and 
religious freedom', The International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 2012, p. 617. 
119 This dialogue is however not constant. Besides, no legal framework provides its 
existence and conditions in Belgian law. The situation is different in European Union law. 
See: S. Wattier, 'Quel dialogue entre l'Union européenne et les organisations religieuses et 
non confessionnelles. Réflexions au départ de la décision du Médiateur européen du 25 
janvier 2013', Cahiers de droit européen, 2015, pp. 535-556. 
120 F. Judo, 'De Geest is niet gehaast', Juristenkrant, 10 Juni 2020, p. 13.  
121 Article 26 of the Constitution states that: 'Belgians have the right to assemble peacefully 




Copyleft – Ius Publicum 
34 
states that the manifestation of one's opinions cannot disturb public order. The French 
Constitutional Council has stated that freedom of demonstration and freedom of expression, 
guaranteed by article 11 of the Déclaration, are intertwined122. Freedom of demonstration 
can be distinguished from freedom of assembly by the fact that there is an intent to manifest 
one's opinions or ideas123.  
However, the two countries differ sharply in one respect. In principle, French law 
applies a system of prior notification. The organiser of a demonstration must notify the 
administrative authorities, which can prohibit it on legitimate grounds. By comparison, 
most Belgian cities have enacted regulations that subject any demonstration to prior 
authorisation. Even if a regime of authorisation is constitutionally valid in Belgium, 'the 
State has a positive obligation to allow the effective exercise of this right'124. The difference 
of system displays apparently broader protection of freedom of demonstration in France, 
which can explain why the French Council of State judged the prohibition disproportionate. 
The proportionality test is critical to determine whether a restriction to the freedom of 
demonstration is constitutionally valid. A higher interest can justify a prohibition if it is 
 
without, however, being subject to prior authorisation. This provision does not apply to 
open-air gatherings, which remain entirely subject to police laws'. 
122 Constitutional Council, nr. 2019-780, 4 April 2019, § 11. 
123 P. Nihoul, 'Le droit de se réunir librement', in M. Verdussen and N. Bonbled (eds.), Les 
droits constitutionnels de Belgique, Bruxelles, Bruylant, 2011, p. 1071. 
124 P. Nihoul, 'Le droit de se réunir librement', in M. Verdussen and N. Bonbled (eds.), Les 
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adapted to the circumstances of time and place125. In front of the Council of State, the 
control of proportionality amounts to control 'the manifest error of appreciation, in other 
words, the error that would not be committed by any administrative authority placed in the 
same situation'126. 
3.3 The Belgian Council of State, a copy of its French homologue? 
After the comparison of legal norms applicable at the international and national levels, 
the paper points out some essential characteristics of the two institutions. Although they are 
similar in their organisation, their powers differ slightly. 
The French Council of State is an old institution, dating back to Napoleonic times. 
Comparatively, the Belgian Council of State is relatively recent, since it was created after 
the Second World War. The law of 23 December 1946 set it up, and the institution was 
effectively born in 1948127. The legislative and doctrinal debates preceding the adoption of 
the law about the Council of State show that the 'French model' was very much influencing 
the idea of having a judge for controlling the administration128. 
 
 
125 P. Nihoul, 'Le droit de se réunir librement', in M. Verdussen and N. Bonbled (eds.), Les 
droits constitutionnels de Belgique, Bruxelles, Bruylant, 2011, p. 1076. 
126 Council of State (Belgium), nr. 232.012, 30 July 2015. 
127 M. Leroy, Contentieux administratif, 5th ed., Limal, Anthémis, 2011, p. 59. 
128 See P. Bouvier, La naissance du Conseil d'État de Belgique : une histoire française ?, 
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In both countries, the Council plays a role as a jurisdiction and a counsellor. In France, 
six sections compose the Council of State, five of which have an advisory competence and 
the last having a jurisdictional competence129. For organisational reasons, this last section 
includes several subsections. In order for the Council of State to remain impartial, a 
counsellor must recuse himself if a case involves a question on which he has given an 
opinion during the advisory phase130. During the pandemic, a debate concerned the 
impartiality of the Council of State in France. The Council of State sometimes had to judge 
the legality of a decision on which he had given its opinion only a few hours before the 
claim131. In Belgium, the Council of State includes two sections: one is advisory, and the 
other is jurisdictional. The advisory section has the competence to provide advice about a 
project of legislative or executive text emanating from a parliament or a government before 
its adoption132. Its competence is similar in France, but more limited regarding executive 
norms133. 
 
129 J. Waline, Droit administratif, 22nd ed., Paris, Dalloz, 2008, pp. 570-571. 
130 J. Waline, Droit administratif, 22nd ed., Paris, Dalloz, 2008, pp. 572. This requirement is 
a consequence of the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights. See: ECHR, 
Procola v. Luxembourg, 28 September 1995, § 45. 
131 P. Cassia, 'Le Conseil d’Etat et l’état d’urgence sanitaire: bas les masques!', Mediapart, 
11 April 2020, https://blogs.mediapart.fr/paul-cassia/blog/100420/le-conseil-d-etat-et-l-etat-
d-urgence-sanitaire-bas-les-masques  (accessed 5 November 2020). 
132 If the text emanates from a Government, the advice is mandatory. If the text emanates 
from a Parliament, the advice is optional. See: Lois coordonnées sur le Conseil d’Etat, 12 
January 1973, art. 2 to 6bis. 
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Perhaps the main difference in terms of organisation concerns the training of 
counsellors. In Belgium, the law requires a law degree to access the position of 
counsellor134. In France, this requirement does not apply, and the National School of 
Administration (Ecole Nationale d'Administration) trained many counsellors. This 
difference of cognitive mindsets might have an impact on the control over administrative 
action135. 
Pertaining to the jurisdictional competences, the Belgian Constitution provides that the 
protection of civil and political rights is the mission of the judiciary power, even if the law 
can provide some exceptions for political rights and if the Council of State has the power to 
adjudicate on the civil effects of its decisions136. Thus, in principle, when a citizen argues 
that a royal or ministerial decree has violated one of his rights and seeks compensation, the 
judiciary power will judge the claim. The conditions for the Council of State to be 
competent is that the procedure constitutes objective litigation ('contentieux objectif'). In 
other words, the claimant pursues the cancellation and, in some instances, the suspension of 
an administrative act because it is illegal137. The real subject matter of the procedure is not 
the right of the claimant but the act of the administration.  
On the contrary, in France, the Council of State and the administrative jurisdictions are 
supposed to judge any litigation involving the administration. Their competence is not 
limited to the annulment of administrative decisions: they also have full jurisdiction, 
 
134 Lois coordonnées sur le Conseil d’Etat, 12 January 1973, art. 70. 
135 On this question: B. Latour, La Fabrique du droit, une ethnologie du Conseil d'Etat, 
Paris, La Découverte, 2002. 
136 Articles 144 and 145 of the Belgian Constitution. 
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namely for administrative sanctions and public contracts. Besides, the Belgian institution 
does not have a procedure equivalent to the 'référé-liberté' allowing the Council of State to 
pronounce injunctions against the administrative authorities. The Belgian Council of State 
can only suspend or cancel an administrative act138. As the analysis underlines further, this 
element had an impact on several claims against the measures adopted against the 
coronavirus. 
  
4. SPECIFIC CIRCUMSTANCES THAT EXPLAIN THE      
DIFFERENCES  
While the previous chapter focused on general features of the human rights protection 
systems in France and Belgium, this last chapter deepens the analysis about the specific 
cases and situations at hand. To begin with, the first section explores the different grounds 
of the emergency measures adopted. The second section analyses the past jurisprudence of 
both Councils of State to compare how the decisions follow it. Finally, the last section 
 
138 The situation is slightly different in the case of a référé introduced in front of the 
ordinary judge. The judge can decide provisional measures on the condition that a 
subjective right is violated by an administrative act. The criterium is, however, not 
straightforward (D. Mougenot, 'Principes de droit judiciaire privé', in Rép. not., t. XIII, 
Bruxelles, Larcier, 2019, n° 222). An action introduced by almost 200 people against the 
COVID-19 measures has been rejected by the court of first instance of Brussels in July. The 
judge considered that no subjective right could be identified and that the Council of State 
was competent for such action. See: Belga, 'Coronavirus en Belgique : l'action en référé 
afin d'obtenir la levée d'une série de mesures liées au Covid rejetée', RTBF.be, 03 July 
2020, https://www.rtbf.be/info/belgique/detail_coronavirus-en-belgique-l-action-en-refere-
afin-d-obtenir-la-levee-d-une-serie-de-mesures-liees-au-covid-rejetee?id=10535960 
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discusses the specific differences between the cases and the case law of the two 
administrative courts through the pandemic, including decisions pronounced during the 
second lockdown. 
4.1. Different foundations for emergency measures 
Crises often imply the activation of specific mechanisms to accelerate and centralise 
decision-making139. In Belgium, the Parliament granted the 'special powers' to the 
Government140. They give the executive branch the power to amend, adopt and even cancel 
legislative rules. The Parliament indicates the means and limits of this power. All the 
decisions adopted by the Government must be validated in due time by the Parliament141. 
However, the situation was somewhat peculiar in Belgium when the crisis of coronavirus 
started since the Government was in caretaker mode ('en affaires courantes'). In this 
context, the Government does not have a majority in Parliament and has not its confidence. 
Its competences are thus limited to dealing with urgent or day-to-day matters. In theory, 
nothing prevents the Parliament from granting special powers to a Government in caretaker 
mode. However, a majority of political parties decided to vote the confidence142.  
 
139 On this question, see: F. Ní Aoláin and O. Gross, Law in Times of Crisis. Emergency 
Powers in Theory and Practise, Cambridge University Press, 2006. 
140 These powers are based on article 105 of the Constitution, which provide that: 'the King 
has no powers other than those formally assigned to him by the Constitution and by the 
special laws enacted by virtue of the Constitution itself'. 
141 For more details about the special powers in Belgian law, see: M. Leroy, 'Les pouvoirs 
spéciaux en Belgique', A.P.T., 2014, pp. 483-504. 
142 For more details about the course of events at the time, see: J. Faniel and C. Sagesser, 
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Nevertheless, the basis of the measures fought in front of the Council of State was not 
these special powers. The measures relied on the law of 31 December 1963 on civil 
protection, the law of 15 May 2007 on civil security and the law on the police function143. 
The law on civil protection provides that the Minister of Interior is competent to take the 
necessary measures to ensure civil protection. Civil protection encompasses 'the set of 
measures and means dedicated to ensuring the protection and survival of the population'144.  
As for the law on civil security, it allows the Minister to forbid the population to move or to 
attend certain places or regions145. The Belgian Constitution sets one crucial limit to the 
measures that can be adopted: according to article 187, 'the Constitution cannot be 
suspended'. 
In France, the decrees judged by the Council of State depended upon the activation of 
the 'state of health emergency'146. The law of 23 March 2020 had newly created this state of 
emergency. However, the opportunity of creating this new exceptional regime is 
questionable, since other legislative provisions of French law could have worked in this 
 
hebdomadaire du CRISP, 2020/2; N. Bernard, 'Les pouvoirs du gouvernement fédéral en 
période de crise : le gouvernement Wilmès face à l’épidémie de Covid-19', J.T., 2020, pp. 
372-375.  
143 Arrêté ministériel portant des mesures d'urgence pour limiter la propagation du 
coronavirus COVID-19, 23 March 2020. 
144 Loi sur la protection civile, 31 December 1963, art. 1 and 4. 
145 Loi sur la sécurité civile, 15 May 2007, art. 182. 
146 On this subject, see: V. Sizaire, 'Un colosse aux pieds d’argile. Les fondements 
juridiques fragiles de l’urgence sanitaire', La Revue des Droits de l'Homme, 2020, 
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context147. However, the new state of emergency provides that the Prime Minister can 
decide to temporarily close certain places of meeting and limit or forbid public 
gatherings148. The provisions explicitly indicate that the measures must remain 
proportionate to the sanitary risk and that they must disappear as soon as they are no longer 
required. The Council of State can judge any dispute arising from these measures pursuant 
to the procedure of the référé-liberté. 
France is familiar with the state of emergency. The terror attacks of 2015 and 2016 
already led to its activation149. During this period, several religious places were closed on 
the motive that discourses propagated extremist ideas inside150. The Council of State 
 
147 M. Nihoul, S. Wattier and F. Xavier, 'L’art de la juste mesure dans la lutte contre le 
coronavirus face à la dimension collective de la liberté de culte', Rev. trim. D.H., 2020, pp. 
1040-1041; A. Gelblat and L. Marguet, 'État d’urgence sanitaire : la doctrine dans tous ses 
états ?', La Revue des Droits de l'Homme, 20 April 2020, 
http://journals.openedition.org/revdh/9066 (accessed 5 November 2020), pp. 2-3. 
148 Loi n° 2020-290 d'urgence pour faire face à l'épidémie de covid-19, 23 March 2020, 
article 3. 
149 On this subject: S. Hennette Vauchez, 'The State of Emergency in France: Days Without 
End?', European Constitutional Law Review, vol. 14, 2018, pp. 700-720; O. Pluen, 'Le(s) 
rôle(s) de contrôle du Conseil constitutionnel et de la juridiction administrative pendant la 
période d’état d’urgence 2015-2017 : entre progression et limites d’une spécificité 
française', Droits, 2019/1, pp. 219-241. 
150 Nineteen religious places had been closed during the state of emergency. See: Senate 
(France), Rapport d'information fait au nom de la commission des lois constitutionnelles, 
de législation, du suffrage universel, du Règlement et d’administration générale (1) par la 
mission de contrôle et de suivi de la loi du 30 octobre 2017 renforçant la sécurité intérieure 
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generally refused to cancel the administrative decisions. However, one weighty argument 
was the fact that other religious places were available around the closed places (see 
further)151. 
Thus, while Belgian measures relied on ordinary laws, French ones were adopted in a 
derogatory set of rules. In this context, it is even more paramount that the jurisdictions 
protect the rights of individuals. In France, the principle of proportionality receives 
emphasis from the law instigating the state of health emergency.  
 
   4.2. Decisions embedded in the established respective case law of each 
Council of State   
The previous section has shown that an unusual legal context led to the adoption of the 
measures. As underlined hereafter, it does not mean that the decisions depart from the 
classical line of the jurisprudence of each Council152.  
However questionable they may be, the decisions rendered by the Belgian Council of 
State are in line with its past case law. The Council of State regularly considers that 'when 
the alleged damage harms fundamental rights, it does not result ipso facto that this damage 
 
151 Council of State (France), nr. 405476, 6 December 2016 ; Council of State (France), nr. 
406618, 20 January 2017; Council of State (France), nr. 416398, 11 January 2018. See also: 
M. Nihoul, S. Wattier and F. Xavier, 'L’art de la juste mesure dans la lutte contre le 
coronavirus face à la dimension collective de la liberté de culte', Rev. trim. D.H., 2020, pp. 
1049-1050. 
152 Neither the Belgian Council of State, nor the French Council or State is bound by the 
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should be considered as serious and difficult to repair'153. Besides, the Council of State 
stresses that it cannot substitute its opinion to one of the administrative authorities: it is 
only in case of manifestly disproportionate measure that the Council of State can act154. It 
does not decide on the merits of an administrative decision. In both countries, the judge 
gives 'a wide margin of appreciation as to the degree of seriousness of the factual 
circumstances likely to undermine public order, the extent of the means to be employed to 
maintain and, where necessary, restore public order and the choice of the most appropriate 
and least restrictive measure possible in the specific circumstances of the case'155. 
Concerning demonstrations in Belgium, previous decisions from the Council of State 
mentioned several elements. For instance, a decision about the prohibition of 
demonstrations justifies the absence of serious damage on the following grounds: the fact 
that the prohibition applies only in specific neighbourhoods, that the claimants can manifest 
their opinions in other places and that the prohibition applies to gatherings of more than ten 
people only156. This last element is interesting since gatherings involving less than twenty 
people were allowed during the déconfinement. In another case, the Council of State takes 
into account three facts to determine that the damage is severe enough to justify the 
 
153 Council of State (Belgium), nr. 217.060, 23 December 2011; Council of State 
(Belgium), nr. 242.017, 29 June 2018; Council of State (Belgium), nr. 221.934, 4 January 
2013. According to the Council of State, this argument has even more importance due to 
the fact that demonstrations are subject to police laws, as provided by article 26 of the 
Constitution. 
154 Council of State (Belgium), nr. 87.974, 51 June 2000. 
155 R. Andersen, 'Liberté de manifester et ordre public' in Liber amicorum Anne Mie Draye, 
Anvers, Intersentia, 2015, p. 218. 
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emergency procedure: the prohibition applies to the entirety of the territory of Brussels, it 
forbids static as well as moving demonstrations, and the decision amounts to a 'decision of 
principle' for any similar demand emanating from the claimant157. In another case, the 
possibility to hold a static demonstration combined to the fact that there is generally a 
demonstration organised per month shows that there was no infringement of the freedom of 
demonstration of the claimant158. The past jurisprudence is thus not unequivocal. Indeed, in 
the case at hand, a static demonstration was forbidden. Moreover, although the decision 
formally pertained to one demonstration, its scope was broader since the prohibition ensued 
from the ministerial decree and was thus the application of a general rule. 
In France, the control of proportionality is enshrined in the jurisprudence of the 
Council of State even if the expression is absent159. It is first in the Benjamin case, in 1933, 
that the Council of State judged that the objective of maintaining the public order must be 
conciliated with the freedom of assembly160. Furthermore, the French Council of State has 
for long considered that a police measure cannot enact a general authorisation system 
unless there is no other mean available161. 
Regarding the specific question of demonstrations, the French Council of State 
normally has no competence about them. The questions arising from their prohibition are 
dealt with by local administrative tribunals. However, appeals are possible against these 
 
157 Council of State (Belgium), nr. 242.017, 29 June 2018. 
158 Council of State (Belgium), nr. 221.934, 4 January 2013. 
159 X. Lamprini, Les principes généraux du droit de l'Union européenne et la jurisprudence 
administrative française, Bruxelles, Bruylant, 2017, pp. 347-348. 
160 Council of State (France), nr. 17413 and 17520, 19 May 1933. 
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decisions. For instance, the Council of State judged that a prohibition motivated by past 
violence and damage to goods from the demonstrators was valid162. 
As for religious ceremonies, the closing of religious places has led to some case law in 
Belgium and France. Apart from isolated decisions, most of them concern the closing of a 
place by the local authorities ('bourgmestres') on the motive of terrorism offences163. The 
Council of State generally considers that the claimants do not fulfil the emergency 
condition, since they do not show that they cannot practise their religion in another place, 
especially when the closing is temporary164. As underlined hereabove, French jurisprudence 
follows the same line on this question.  
However, the critical difference in the cases deferred to the two Councils of State is the 
fact that every religious ceremony was forbidden and the only alternative was to attend the 
religious services online. One can wonder whether the possibility of online religious 
ceremonies is sufficient enough to judge that the prohibition of physical ones is 
proportionate. There may be a symbolic and social dimension consubstantial to a religious 
ceremony that differs from other activities. Attending a religious ceremony could be 
considered as a crucial moment of social bonding, incorporated by the belonging to a 
'religious community' which is not adequately replaced by an online alternative, especially 
during several months.  
 
162 Council of State (France), nr. 383091, 26 July 2014. 
163 On this question, see: F. Xavier, 'La fermeture par le bourgmestre des établissements 
suspectés d’abriter des activités terroristes', C.D.P.K., 2018, pp. 22-50. 
164 See Council of State (Belgium), 203.428, 29 April 2010; Council of State (Belgium), 
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Besides, this reasoning could apply demonstrations as well. As underlined previously, 
they are a crucial mean to express opinions. They also create social links and diffuse 
messages as to the identity, needs and vulnerabilities of people who attend them. Public 
authorities should not underestimate the symbolic dimensions of freedom of religion and 
freedom of manifestation.  
    4.3. Timing, factual differences or a different willingness to use its powers? 
The preceding section has put the cases at hand in the context of the previous case law 
of the two administrative courts. Subsequently, this section examines some of the other 
decisions pronounced during the COVID-19 pandemic165. In general, the tendency followed 
by the two Councils of State is to protect the decisions adopted by the public authorities. 
Even if the Council of State of France has accepted the two claims analysed in this 
paper, it is not true for all the actions it received during the first lockdown (March-June 
2020). For instance, the prohibition of open or inside markets was considered proportionate 
by the Council of State166. Nevertheless, 'in both cases, the Council of State of France has 
been careful to ensure that the measures maintained in the context of deconfinement do not 
disproportionately infringe fundamental freedoms'167. 
 
165 At the time of writing this paper, the pandemic is still ongoing. The Belgian and French 
Councils of State continue to pronounce decisions about the measures adopted in this 
context. 
166 Council of State (France), nr. 439762, 1st April 2020. 
167 M. Nihoul, S. Wattier and F. Xavier, 'L’art de la juste mesure dans la lutte contre le 
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Still, the French Council of State has accepted, at least partially, several demands168. 
For instance, it has rejected the request to enforce a total lockdown but has ordered the 
Government to detail the scope of certain measures and to evaluate the risks of specific 
situations169. It has also considered that administrative authorities could not generally 
impose the wearing of a facial mask170. The Council of State has also given the authorities 
an injunction to distribute facial masks to prisoners171. It also judged that the obligation to 
wear a mask should be limited to coherent zones characterised by a high density of 
population172. The Council of State has considered that thermic cameras were contrary to 
 
168 But only a 'tiny proportion of the demands' (L. Vatna, 'Le juge administratif et la crise de 
la covid-19. Entre protection de la santé et respect des libertés : le juge administratif à 
l’épreuve de la covid-19', La Revue des Droits de l'Homme, 2020, 
http://journals.openedition.org/revdh/10542 (accessed 9 November 2020)). 
169 Council of State (France), nr. 439674, 22 March 2020. See: J. de Gliniasty, 'La gestion 
de la pandémie par la puissance publique devant le Conseil d’État à l’aune de l’ordonnance 
de référé du 22 mars 2020', La Revue des Droits de l'Homme, 2020, 
http://journals.openedition.org/revdh/9447 (accessed 9 November 2020). 
170 Council of State (France), nr. 440057, 17 April 2020;Council of State (France), nr. 
443.750, 6 September 2020. About the first decision, see: J. Mattiussi, 'La liberté 
vestimentaire démasquée ? À propos de l’ordonnance du Conseil d’État en date du 17 avril 
2020', La Revue des Droits de l'Homme, 2020, http://journals.openedition.org/revdh/9116 
(accessed 9 November 2020). 
171 Council of State (France), nr. 440151, 7 May 2020. As such, this decision does not 
disturb the lockdown. It provides rather a humanitarian measure. 
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the GDPR173 as well as the use of drones174. Besides, it has estimated that the generalisation 
of a procedure involving one judge for asylum procedures was disproportionate175. Perhaps 
more anecdotal, the Council of State has enjoined the authorities to adapt the regulation to 
make unambiguous that the bicycle was a perfectly valid mean of transport during the 
lockdown176. Far more actions have nonetheless been dismissed177, including some 
challenging directly the state of health emergency178. One critical element is the fact that 
the Council of State accepted the actions either before the full lockdown or after the easing. 
On the contrary, during the crisis triggered by the pandemic, the Belgian Council of 
State has been reluctant to suspend the measures adopted by the authorities. It rejected 
some actions on purely procedural grounds179. Other demands were denied because the 
 
173 Council of State (France), nr. 441065, 26 June 2020. 
174 Council of State (France), nr. 440442 and 440445, 18 May 2020. 
175 Council of State (France), nr. 440717, 440812 and 440867, 8 June 2020. 
176 Council of State (France), nr. 440179, 30 April 2020. 
177 See for instance: Council of State (France), nr. 439693, 28 March 2020; Council of State 
(France), nr. 439726, 28 March 2020; Council of State (France), nr. 440321, 22 May 2020; 
Council of State (France), nr. 440701, 8 June 2020; Council of State (France), nr. 444741, 8 
October 2020. These arrests pertain to alleged violation arising from insufficient measures 
of the State, namely regarding the equipment of healthcare workers or the distribution of 
facial masks. See also: Council of State (France), nr. 441449, 441552 and 441771, 13 July 
2020; Council of State (France), nr. 439762, 1st April 2020.  
178 See: Council of State (France), nr. 445367, 29 October 2020. 
179 See for instance: Council of State (Belgium), nr. 247.710, 4 June 2020; Council of State 
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damage sustained by the claimant was financial and, thus, reparable180, not severe 
enough181 or insufficiently substantiated182. While most decisions rejected the claim on the 
motive that there was no emergency, recent decisions have dismissed demands because the 
argument was not serious183. Interestingly, the analysis was more thorough in these 
decisions than in the previous ones, as if the need for justification was greater now. 
 
2020. These arrests dismiss the actions on the motive that the claimants ask the Council of 
State to partially suspend a ministerial decree, which is not one of its prerogatives. See also: 
Council of State (Belgium), nr. 248.108, 3 August 2020; Council of State (Belgium), nr. 
248.109, 3 August 2020. These arrests reject the actions because the suspension of the acts 
would have no effect on the situation of the claimants. See as well: Council of State 
(Belgium), nr. 247.472, 29 April 2020; Council of State (Belgium), nr. 248.189, 28 August 
2020; Council of State (Belgium), nr. 248.231, 8 September 2020. The applications were 
dismissed because the claimants have delayed the introduction of their claims, which is 
incompatible with the notion of emergency. See then: Council of State (Belgium), nr. 
247.919, 26 June 2020. The action of the claimant is rejected because the act attacked has 
been withdrawn. 
180 See for instance: Council of State (Belgium), nr. 247.856, 22 June 2020. 
181 See for instance: Council of State (Belgium), nr. 247.939, 26 June 2020. 
182 See for instance: Council of State (Belgium), nr. 248.270, 15 September 2020; Council 
of State (Belgium), nr. 248.130, 7 August 2020. 
183 See for instance: Council of State (Belgium), nr. 248.780, 28 October 2020; Council of 
State (Belgium), nr. 248.818, 30 October 2020; Council of State (Belgium), nr. 248.819, 30 
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In a decision pronounced in chamber and not by a single counsellor184, the Belgian 
Council of State insisted that it is competent 'to examine whether the Minister relied on 
genuinely existing and relevant elements of fact, which have been ascertained with all 
necessary rigour, whether he correctly assessed and rigorously weighed up all the interests 
involved and whether, on this basis, he was able to make his decision within the limits of 
reasonableness'185. This formulation shows the broad margin of appreciation that the State 
enjoys. It indicates that the control of proportionality is marginal and does not replace the 
appreciation of the administrative authorities. 
Concerning freedom of religion, the Council of State relied on the Belgian episcopal 
conference to decide that the inconvenience of wearing the mask during religious 
ceremonies was not sufficiently severe186. There are thus two decisions in which the 
Council of State refers to the official position of the religious authorities. Such reference is 
questionable since believers can have convictions that do not precisely follow the official 
position of their religious authorities, and they should be respected.  
Regarding the two questions analysed in this commentary, authors have also 
underlined the importance of the timing to explain the diverging decisions of the French 
Council of State and its Belgian homologue187. It seems complicated to be 'on time' in front 
of the Belgian Council of State… 
 
184 Which is usually the rule for an extreme emergency procedure. 
185 Council of State (Belgium), nr. 248.781, 28 October 2020. 
186 Council of State (Belgium), nr. 248.124, 5 August 2020. 
187 M. Nihoul, S. Wattier and F. Xavier, 'L’art de la juste mesure dans la lutte contre le 
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Another difference in the decision about freedom of demonstration is numerical. While 
Belgium authorised gatherings of twenty people, they were limited to ten in France. Since 
the numerical limit was lower in France, the infringement seemed more severe. This is an 
element weighing in favour of the annulment in the proportionality test. 
Besides, in French affairs, the Council of State judged that the restrictions to 
fundamental freedoms had an absolute and general scope188. On the contrary, the Belgian 
Council considered only an isolated demonstration and decided that the prohibition of 
religious ceremonies was not general since an evaluation was coming.  
In addition, the French Council of State relied on official scientific arguments, which is 
not at all the case of the Belgian Council of State189. The French Council of State also took 
into account the lack of effectivity of the prohibition of demonstrations to decide that the 
decree was unconstitutional190. The Belgian Council of State largely ignored the fact that 
 
188 S. Degirmenci, 'Liberté de manifester en état d’urgence sanitaire: le Conseil d’État 
desserre enfin la nasse !', Goutal, Alibert et Associés, 16 June 2020, http://www.goutal-
alibert.net/liberte-de-manifester-en-etat-durgence-sanitaire-le-conseil-detat-desserre-enfin-
la-nasse-ce-13-juin-2020-req-n-440846-decret-n-2020-724-du-14-juin-2020/ (accessed 28 
October 2020). 
189 On this subject, see the Revue française d'administration publique, nr. 173, 2020, whose 
theme is 'L’action publique, l’expertise et le juge'. 
190 S. Degirmenci, 'Liberté de manifester en état d’urgence sanitaire: le Conseil d’État 
desserre enfin la nasse !', Goutal, Alibert et Associés, 16 June 2020, http://www.goutal-
alibert.net/liberte-de-manifester-en-etat-durgence-sanitaire-le-conseil-detat-desserre-enfin-
la-nasse-ce-13-juin-2020-req-n-440846-decret-n-2020-724-du-14-juin-2020/ (accessed 28 
October 2020). About effectiveness, see: M. de Benedetto, 'Effective Law from a 
Regulatory and Administrative Law Perspective', European Journal of Risk Regulation, nr. 
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several demonstrations took place despite the prohibition established by the ministerial 
decree191. 
As for demonstrations, the French Council of State pronounced another decision on 6 
July 2020192. The Prime Minister had indeed enacted a new decree after the first decision: 
the prefect should authorise any demonstration, and no demonstration could take place with 
more than five thousand people. The Council considered that such a regime was contrary to 
the fundamental freedoms since it added an authorisation mechanism to the system of 
declaration. Indeed, any demonstration was forbidden, except if the prefect gave its 
authorisation. This second decision shows the importance that the French Council of State 
gave to certain fundamental rights during the pandemic, namely the right to express one's 
ideas in a context marked by the necessity of debate193. The extent of powers given to the 
prefect, who is a non-elected state representative, might also have justified the annulment. 
 
 
191 For instance, some demonstrations were not authorised but tolerated, namely in 
Brussels. See: Belga, 'La Ville de Bruxelles tolère la manifestation du mouvement Black 
Lives Matter', Le Soir, 5 June 2020, https://www.lesoir.be/305282/article/2020-06-05/la-
ville-de-bruxelles-tolere-la-manifestation-du-mouvement-black-lives-matter (accessed 5 
November 2020). 
192 Council of State (France), nr. 441257, 441263 and 441384, 6 July 2020.  
193 The existence of a public debate is a criterion used by the ECHR in its case law, 
especially in cases involving freedom of expression. See for instance: ECHR, Giesbert and 
others v. France, 1 June 2017, §§ 92-94; ECHR, Von Hannover v. Germany, 19 September 
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Finally, it is worth mentioning the decisions pronounced by the two Councils of State 
about freedom of religion during the second lockdown. In France, the Council of State 
judged on 7 November 2020 that the prohibition of religious ceremonies, except for 
weddings and funerals, was proportionate194. A few weeks later, the government eased the 
restrictions and allowed religious ceremonies up to thirty people. However, the Council of 
State considered that this numerical limit was not proportionate, namely because it was not 
adapted to the size of the religious places195. It seems thus that the French Council of State 
has a stricter appreciation when an easing of the lockdown is decided, which is 
understandable. 
As for the Belgian Council of State, it decided for the first time during the pandemic 
that a restriction on fundamental rights was disproportionate196. In particular, the numerical 
limit imposed on weddings and funerals was not adequately justified. While fourteen 
people could attend funerals, only five were allowed at weddings. This limit was 
particularly strict in the case of Jewish weddings, which require the presence of ten men. 
The decision of the Council of State remains surprising, since it takes a completely 
different perspective compared to the decision pronounced during the first déconfinement. 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS    
To conclude, it seems that no unique explanation can be persuasively singled out for 
the difference of case law between the two Councils of State. However, the importance of 
proportionality percolates through French law and the jurisprudence of the Council of State. 
 
194 Council of State (France), nr. 445825 and others, 7 November 2020. 
195 Council of State (France), nr. 446930 and others, 29 November 2020. 




Copyleft – Ius Publicum 
54 
In Belgium, the principle barely appears in the COVID-19 case law at hand. Besides 
proportionality, the paper has emphasised several elements that could explain the 
divergence between the jurisprudence of the two Councils of State. 
On the one hand, the Belgian Council of State remains in a procedural approach of the 
cases brought to it197. On the other hand, the French Council of State relied on scientific 
arguments and perhaps on 'pragmatism'198 to strike down the decrees adopted by the Prime 
Minister. Thus, it is likely that the difference of approach between the two administrative 
courts depends on the degree of emphasis on the procedural rules. It seems in particular that 
the condition of emergency is appreciated far more severely in Belgium than in France. 
Furthermore, the variations in the system of protection of fundamental rights bring an 
explanation as well. Indeed, demonstrations are under a system of notification in France. 
Shifting the paradigm towards a system of prohibition, unless authorisation, is thus a 
greater move than in Belgium where any demonstration must be authorised. As for 
religious ceremonies, the dialogue maintained by the Belgian State with religious 
authorities during these exceptional circumstances seems to have worked against the short 
term interests of the believers. 
 
197 Such legalistic approach is (understandably) a characteristic of the case law of the 
Belgian Council of State. It is one of the reasons that explain the reform of 2014. See: B. 
Cuvelier, M. Joassart and R. Born, 'La genèse de la réforme du Conseil d'Etat', A.P.T., 
2016/3, pp. 213-234. 
198 R. Matta-Duvignau, 'Le Conseil d’État garant de la liberté de manifester dans le contexte 
d’état d’urgence sanitaire', Le blog des juristes, 24 June 2020, 
https://www.leclubdesjuristes.com/blog-du-coronavirus/que-dit-le-droit/le-conseil-detat-
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Besides, despite the close similarities of the cases analysed, factual differences remain 
central. Numerical limits bear a substantial effect. The timing of the decisions is also not 
identical. Little details can sometimes have a decisive impact. 
In general, the Belgian Council of State has been less keen than its French homologue 
to suspend the measures adopted during the coronavirus pandemic199. Nonetheless, the 
number of French decisions that lead to a suspension remains scarce compared to the ones 
rejecting the claim200. Besides, the analysis does not take into account the fact that certain 
decisions, especially at the local level, could have been negotiated with the civil society, 
which diminishes the probability of a legal challenge. 
To sum up, while there are differences between the jurisprudence of the two Councils 
of State, they should not be exaggerated. The French Council of State has visibly attached 
greater importance on some issues than the Belgian Council of State. Whether this is a 
general trend of administrative jurisprudence remains to be studied. 
 
199 See however: Council of State (Belgium), nr. 248.541, 9 October 2020. 
200 The President of the contentious section of the Council of State wrote an opinion in the 
press to remind the public that it was not the mission of the judge to replace the 
administration (J.-D. Combrexelle, 'Les juges administratifs du Conseil d’Etat se situent 
loin des polémiques', Le Monde, 12.04.2020, 
https://www.lemonde.fr/idees/article/2020/04/12/jean-denis-combrexelle-les-juges-
administratifs-du-conseil-d-etat-se-situent-loin-des-polemiques_6036387_3232.html 
(accessed 5 November 2020)). 
